I was said to be “close-minded” for not entertaining the idea that a particular thing exists. It is not close-minded to argue that a thing does not exist, or very likely does not exist, provided there is sound reasoning for its nonexistence. The truth value of a thing is not ascertained by merely assuming it exists, lest we necessarily assume all things exist, and therefore no things at all can exist. Thus, the default truth value of a thing is not “1” but “0”, or in other words: the default state of a thing is non-existent; meaning—a thing of itself exists distinctly apart from and in relation to each of the other things in existence, but also necessarily from that which is non-existent, lest a state of existence possessed of the existence of only one thing is necessarily an existence in which this one thing exists as all things, for it is the only thing in existence and thus bears no relation to any other thing.
Being the only thing in existence necessarily implies a thing to be infinite in scope, as again it bears no relation to any other thing—not even the possibility of other things with which to compare it—meaning, paradoxically, it exists not even in relation to the “no-thing(s)”, thus necessarily a thing infinite in its existence and implying it is, at the same time, no thing at all. With no other thing distinct from the one and only thing in existence, this one thing virtually exists in two states: existence and non-existence.
However, for any singular thing that exists to be represented in our minds, it must be comprehended and represented as that and only that which is itself the thing (which is to say, only that and no other things), including being distinct from and independently of that which it is not: non-existence. How this is physically so is not quite as important as how this conceptually comes to be so, as it is with concepts that we first and foremost concern ourselves when attempting to comprehend the physical, or the theoretical vis-à-vis the actual, or the physics of the theoretical vis-à-vis our physics having been observed and-or applied: theory vis-à-vis praxis.
Henceforth, any one thing, for all intents and purposes, is a conceptual thing and simply referred to as a “concept”—necessarily singular, complete in and wholly of itself, thus not existing partially of itself; as in, there are no “partial concepts”—no idea, or “identity”, conceived in and of itself, that is but a partial conceptualization of itself, as this would be a contradiction in terms. In other words, in order for a thing to be a thing and thus identifiable as said thing, it must indeed be that which is itself the thing. All of this is to say that in order to determine the relationship between any of the things in existence and understand the world, we first must cognitively impose logical order by identifying each thing apart from that which is otherwise chaotic, incomprehensible, irrelevant: non-existence—which, for all practical purposes, is a meaningless thing, but a conceptual thing nonetheless.
We thus ascribe to a thing that ‘is’ a truth value of “1”, because said thing necessarily exists as a concept unto itself independently of any other concept and therefore is said to be “true”. If a thing is said to be “partially true” (which, as a concept existing of itself independently of any other concept, is an impossibility), then the thing as a distinct concept is rendered null and can no longer be deemed true. As such, as a thing that simply ‘is not’, it is assigned a truth value of “0”. There is no point between “1” and “0” at which a thing partially exists, as this would take the form of “becoming”, which as a concept, is mathematically something else entirely.
Existence as a concept is defined by negation. This is to say we conceive of things in existence by contrasting them to that which is not and assigning them a truth value of “1”. Ironically, we actually have no clue as to whether existence and non-existence are “real” things, for we cannot actually know this. They are merely constructs by which we have come to make sense of the known universe. It is the point at which the term “real” comes to have any meaning whatsoever—a practical extension of the demarcation between that which we call “existence” and that which we call “non-existence”, distinguishing each and all things that “exist” from that which simply…are not the things. Within the general context of existence do we determine the truth value of particular existences and their relationship to one another for the sake of navigating and surviving the world in which we seem to have emerged.
Which brings us full-circle: if you are going to argue for the existence of a thing, your argument depends first of all on your ability to define said thing; if you are unable to do so, then you truly believe in nothing at all, because you fail to even distinguish the thing in which you believe from total nothingness, as well as apart from the things in this world which in fact do exist. Following a complete conception or definition of the thing in which one believes to exist or be true, one need support this via a set of other truth values logically arranged such that the existence of the thing is strongly or necessarily affirmed on the basis thereof. This includes, as much as it does anything in the waking known universe, “gods”, which remain: total fucking nonsense.
One may demonstrate this by parsing the very mechanics of how one comes by any knowledge whatsoever, which is essentially what I have just done, by breaking down to its logical components what it means to indeed be a “thing” or “no-thing”; to exist or not exist; to be or not to be: 1 or 0. Any reader who gets upset at me for explaining this (though, in my mind, there is no offense to be had) should ask of oneself the cause of being upset in the first place, and thus one is surely to realize it is not at all my problem. The problem is the reader is simply unable to distinguish a thing of fiction from that which is non-fiction.
Furthermore, “close-mindedness” of itself as a concept is inherently flawed, one epistemologically oriented only with respect to the mind of oneself, suggesting the idea not only flawed but hypocritical, essentially an attack ad hominem condescendingly invoked for no other reason than to escape the criticism of those who criticize. Indeed, if one is to prove oneself “open-minded”, as it were, one must address criticism from other minds, lest the only person demonstrating oneself to be close-minded is the person accusing other minds of being closed—minds presumably addressing the argument of the accuser, thus the accuser must in turn address the arguments of other minds, and in so doing shall reveal the absurdity of “close-mindedness” as a concept used as a rhetorical device during argumentation. If a proponent cannot sufficiently address the opponents of an argument, then the argument of the proponent stands as the lesser of the arguments that the proponent has failed to address, provided the proponent cares to even do so.